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3The Dynamic Relations between Economic Conditions and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: 
A Natural Experiment in Times of the European Economic Crisis
Abstract
Theories on intergroup relations suggest that negative attitudes toward immigrants tend to rise
when economic conditions deteriorate. However, these arguments were mostly tested during 
times of economic prosperity in Europe. We put this theoretical expectation to test by 
analyzing two rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) with data from 14 West European 
immigration countries before (2006) and after (2010) the peak of the European economic 
crisis. Results show that anti-immigrant sentiments increased in countries where perceptions 
of economic insecurity also increased. Anti-immigrant sentiments decreased in countries 
where perceptions of economic insecurity declined. In contrast, changes in objective 
economic conditions (i.e. unemployment rates) during the same period of time did not display
the expected effects in a similarly robust way.
Keywords
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subjective and objective economic conditions
4Introduction
Immigration scholars have long expected a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment in times of 
economic decline (e.g. Blalock, 1967). According to the logic embodied in the ‘competitive 
threat’ theoretical model, an increase in the size of an immigrant population (the so-called 
‘outgroup population’) and deteriorating economic conditions are likely to prompt a rise in 
anti-immigrant sentiments (Coenders and Scheepers, 2008; Davidov and Meuleman, 2012; 
Davidov et al., 2014a; Semyonov et al., 2006). This is so because both size of the immigrant 
population and the economic situation are viewed as two major sources of threat of 
competition over social and economic resources. More specifically, competitive threat is more
intense with increasing size of the immigrant population and with deterioration of economic 
conditions. Hence, attitudes toward immigrants may be more negative when and where 
competitive threat is rising (Gorodzeisky, 2011; Meuleman et al., 2009; Quillian, 1995, 1996; 
Semyonov et al., 2006). 
Empirical findings of studies that put the competitive threat theory to test are rather 
mixed. Several studies lend support to the argument that anti-immigrant sentiment tends to 
increase with the relative size of the immigrant population in the community (e.g. Quillian, 
1995, 1996; Semyonov et al., 2006), whereas others did not find such an association (e.g. 
Meuleman et al., 2009; Semyonov et al., 2004; Strabac and Listhaug, 2008). Similarly, 
whereas several studies provided support for the thesis that depressed economic conditions 
(measured by GNP and unemployment rate) are associated with deeper hostility and with 
negative attitudes toward immigrants (Coenders et al., 2004; Quillian, 1995; Scheepers et al., 
2002; Semyonov et al., 2000, 2006), others provided only partial or no support for this thesis 
(e.g. Davidov and Meuleman, 2012; Gorodzeisky, 2011; Schneider, 2008; for a review, see 
Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). Failure to provide support for the theory in some of these 
studies may be accounted for by three alternative, but by no means contradictory, sources. 
5The first source could be a disparity between theory and methodology due to data 
limitations. Whereas the theoretical expectation is cast within a dynamic framework, most 
research on the topic utilized cross-sectional data on the individual and the country levels for 
analyzing the relations between economic conditions and attitudes toward immigrants (for 
exceptions see, e.g. Coenders and Scheepers, 1998, 2008; Meuleman et al., 2009; Semyonov 
et al., 2006). The second source may be the frequent focus on objective economic conditions 
in previous studies. It could well be the case that the way respondents subjectively perceive 
their economic situation may play an important role in the formation of their attitudes. The 
third source may be situational. Economic conditions in Europe were quite stable and 
prosperous during the time periods covered by much of the previous research (e.g. Semyonov 
et al., 2006: 444). In the current study, we will consider each of these possibilities from both a
theoretical and an empirical perspective.
Taking advantage of an unforeseen event, the European economic crisis of 2008, we 
address these potential shortcomings of previous studies on anti-immigrant sentiments. This 
event enables us to analyze data before and after the crisis as if it were a natural experiment 
(Creighton et al., 2015) and to test the dynamic relations between changing economic 
conditions – both objective and subjective – and change in attitudes toward immigrants. In 
other words, we deliberately use data from two time points to provide a rigorous test of group 
competition theory in classical immigration-receiving European countries during the 
historically unique and critical periods of before and after the peak of the economic crisis.1 
Specifically, we analyze data obtained from two rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) 
in 14 West European immigration countries before and after the peak of the European 
economic crisis of 2008. Thus, we are in a unique position to test dynamic elements of the 
theory (see, e.g. Meuleman et al., 2009; Semyonov et al., 2006) at a critical period of time 
while considering both objective and subjective measures of the economic situation both at 
the individual and contextual levels. 
6Previous research on sources of anti-immigrant attitudes and hypotheses
There is a large body of literature that successfully describes and explains negative attitudes 
toward immigrants in Europe and other countries (for reviews, see e.g. Ceobanu and 
Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). The studies on the issue used diverse 
theoretical explanations for the evolvement of anti-immigrant sentiments. However, there is 
little doubt that one of the most prominent explanations in this literature relies on the ‘group 
threat’ theoretical model. Blumer (1958), Blalock (1967) as well as Quillian (1996) advanced 
explanations for the formation and evolvement of negative attitudes toward minorities and 
outgroup populations. According to the group threat model, presence of an outgroup 
population prompts fear of competition over resources. Fear of competition, in turn, is likely 
to increase prejudice and hostility toward the outgroup population. Threat or fear of 
competition over resources is a major source of anti-immigrant sentiments and their 
longitudinal change (see also Smith, 2015). Threat exists both at the individual level and the 
group (structural) level. This view suggests that the majority population regards economic and
cultural resources as scarce and limited. Consequently, members of the majority population 
consider immigrants as potential competitors for such resources, hence, as a threat to their 
well-being. 
At the individual level, threat is more pronounced among the socially and 
economically vulnerable groups. More specifically, unemployed individuals with low 
(perceived) income or low level of education are particularly vulnerable and, thus, threatened 
by competition due to newcomers. The threat is geared up by the perception that immigrants 
take away jobs, exploit the welfare system, and compete over housing and other social 
resources. The logic of the ‘competitive threat’ model leads to the expectation that individuals
who are socially and economically vulnerable would express more negative attitudes toward 
immigrants (Gorodzeisky, 2011; Kunovich, 2004; Pichler, 2010; Raijman et al., 2003; 
7Semyonov and Glikman, 2009; Semyonov et al., 2006, 2008). Similarly, when economic 
conditions in the country get worse and jobs become scarce, more individuals will feel 
threatened by newcomers and, thus, will express negative attitudes toward the immigrant 
population (Meuleman et al., 2009).
Along this line of logic, researchers contend that not only individual-level 
characteristics (e.g. socio-demographic and economic attributes) but also a country’s 
economic conditions are predictive of anti-immigrant attitudes (Blalock, 1967; Coenders et 
al., 2004; Gorodzeisky, 2011; Davis and Deole, 2015; Kunovich, 2004; Lahav, 2004; 
Meuleman et al., 2009; Pichler, 2010; Quillian, 1995, 1996; Scheepers et al., 2002; Semyonov
et al., 2006). The studies we cited above advance the argument that bad and unfavorable 
economic conditions increase economic competition. As a result, threat due to the presence of 
immigrants (as an outgroup population) increases negative attitudes toward immigrants. It 
should be noted that group threat could be realistic as well as perceived. In other words, this 
mechanism could operate with both objective and aggregated subjective perceptions of the 
economic situation of individuals. Indeed, objective and aggregated subjective economic 
insecurity may or may not have similar consequences in the formation of attitudes toward 
immigration. Nevertheless, the majority of studies to date focused on realistic economic (e.g. 
unemployment rate, gross domestic product -GDP) rather than on perceived economic 
conditions. Also in times of economic crisis, both objective indicators and perceived 
economic insecurity may strongly operate in shaping and forming negative attitudes and 
hostility toward immigrants. 
Following this theoretical reasoning, a large body of research examined whether a 
vulnerable economic situation at the individual level and depressed economic conditions at 
the country level coupled with rising immigration are likely to increase negative attitudes 
toward immigrants (Gijsberts et al., 2004; Kaufmann, 2014; Kunovich, 2004; Scheepers et al.,
82002; Schlüter and Wagner, 2008; Schneider, 2008; Semyonov et al., 2006; Strabac and 
Listhaug, 2008). Whereas individual-level predictors such as low education or low income 
provided consistent and firm support for the expectation that vulnerable individuals express 
more negative attitudes toward immigrants, country-level predictors such as unemployment 
rate (or GDP) provided somewhat less consistent support for group threat theory: Coenders 
and colleagues (2004), Kunovich ( 2004), Lahav (2004), or Quillian (1995) contributed 
empirical evidence to the thesis that economic conditions (in the context of European 
societies) are associated with attitudes toward immigration. A few other studies provided 
mixed or no evidence for this postulation. For example, Scheepers et al. (2002) found no 
effect of unemployment rate in European countries on threats generated by immigrants. 
Likewise, Meuleman et al. (2009) found no effect of the absolute level of economic 
conditions (GDP/c) on attitudes toward immigrants in European countries. We are not aware 
of previous research that examined whether and to what extent the aggregated perceptions of 
economic insecurity in a country foster negative sentiment toward immigration independently 
of the commonly used objective economic conditions.
Several scholars advance an alternative proposition suggesting that the presence of 
immigrants may in fact reduce (rather than increase) hostility of the host society members 
toward immigrants rather than increase it (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Schlüter and Wagner, 
2008; Weber, 2015). This literature suggests that contact, which becomes possible when a 
large number of immigrants are present, is a very effective means to reduce enmity of the host
society toward newcomers by lowering anxiety and increasing knowledge and empathy 
toward them (Thomsen and Birkmose, 2015). Although past studies suggested that only 
positive contacts may lead to such an outcome (Allport, 1954), Pettigrew (1998) and 
Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) found that also negative contact may reduce hostility toward 
immigrants. A few studies have put both group threat and contact theories to test in a single 
framework. For example, Schlüter and Wagner (2008) found empirical support for both of 
9them, implying that the two theories are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary. A 
larger immigrant group size both increases threat and contact, whereas contact in turn reduces 
threat. Thus, both processes operate in a complementary way. Furthermore, Weber (2015) 
found that contact operates rather on the higher (regional) level. Since our main goal in this 
study is the effect of the economic conditions on threat, we will not focus on the additional 
effect of immigrant size on contact and on reducing anxiety and threat, but just control for it. 
To date, most studies on attitudes toward immigrants in Europe applied a static (i.e. 
cross-sectional) research framework, and only a few examined trends in such attitudes and 
their sources within a dynamic framework (i.e. exceptions include Coenders and Scheepers, 
1998, 2008; Meuleman et al., 2009; Semyonov et al., 2006). More specifically, Coenders and 
Scheepers (1998) examined change in the support of ethnic discrimination in the Netherlands 
between the end of the 1970s and the mid-1990s. In another study, the same authors (i.e. 
Coenders and Scheepers, 2008) investigated trends in support of social integration of guest 
workers among Germans. Semyonov and colleagues (2006) analyzed the sources of anti-
foreigner sentiments in 12 European countries and on four measurement occasions between 
1988 and 2000. Meuleman et al. (2009) investigated change in anti-immigrant sentiments 
between 2002 and 2006 in diverse European countries. The latter study provided support for a
dynamic version of the theory by demonstrating that worsening economic conditions or 
increase in the size of the immigrant population (rather than their absolute level) result in 
increasing negative attitudes toward immigrants. 
In sum, reviewing the theoretical models and the previous studies carried out in the 
European context leads us to formulate the following three hypotheses: At the individual level
(H1) we expect that the lower the subjective (perceived) income the stronger the negative 
attitudes toward immigrants at both points in time2. At the country level, and relying on the 
dynamic version of group threat theory, we expect (H2a) rising unemployment in a country to
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result in more negative attitudes toward immigrants, and (H2b) declining unemployment rates
to result in less negative attitudes toward immigrants. Furthermore, we expect (H3a) rising 
aggregate levels of subjective income insecurity to result in more negative attitudes toward 
immigrants, and (H3b) declining aggregate levels of subjective income insecurity to result in 
less negative attitudes toward immigrants. Table 1 provides a summary of the predictors and 
the hypotheses.
Table 1 about here
The present research, thus, joins the small group of studies that adopted and utilized a 
dynamic (rather than a static) framework to examine whether level or change in attitudes 
toward immigrants were driven by changing economic conditions – both objective and 
subjective. We test our hypotheses at two time points, before and after the European economic
crisis that took place around 2008. Before proceeding with the analysis of the data, a brief 
overview of the setting seems in order. 
The Setting
In recent years, Europe experienced its worst economic crisis since the 1930s (Billiet 
et al., 2014). Many people lost their jobs, and the European markets struggled with low and 
declining economic growth, decreasing budgets for social welfare, increasing unemployment, 
and increasing economic insecurity (Billiet et al., 2014). However, the crisis did not impact all
European countries in a similar way. Some countries suffered more severely from the crisis 
than others. For example, Germany and Norway enjoyed economic growth whereas Greece, 
Spain, and Ireland experienced a severe decline. At the same time, unemployment rates 
decreased in Germany but increased steeply, especially among younger cohorts, in Greece and
Spain (International Labor Force Survey: International Labour Organization, ILO, 2013). 
Thus, the cross-country variation in change of economic conditions in Europe across time 
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(before and after the peak of the crisis) offers us the opportunity to test the predictive validity 
of a dynamic version of group threat theory. Indeed, the quasi-experimental research design 
that we implemented here offers a unique opportunity to examine whether change in anti-
immigrant sentiments were more evident in countries where objective and subjective 
economic conditions had deteriorated more severely (due to the crisis), according to the 
dynamic version of the model of group threat theory.
Data and Variables
In the present study we utilize two rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) with 
individual-level data from 14 West European countries right before (2006, round 3) and after 
(2010, round 5), the peak of the European economic crisis. The only exception was Greece: 
The Greek data were from the 2004 ESS wave because data for Greece were not available for 
2006. The ESS is a high-standard, biennial representative survey of the European public aged 
15 and older employing a multistage random sampling design and conducting face-to-face 
interviews (Jowell et al., 2007). We retrieved data for theses analyses from 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/. The website includes further information and 
documentation on sampling procedures and the questionnaires. We handled missing values 
(including ‘don’t knows’) using the recommended Full Information Maximum Likelihood 
(FIML) procedure (see Schafer and Graham 2002) implemented in Mplus (Muthén and 
Muthén 1998-2012). 
The 14 West European countries in the study are: Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), 
Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Great Britain (GB), Greece (GR)3, Ireland (IE), 
Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), and Switzerland 
(CH). Table 2 presents the sample sizes for each country after excluding respondents who 
were not born in the country or whose mother or father were not born in the country. We 
purposely decided to focus only on these European countries, because in these countries 
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immigration obviously plays either a continuous or an increasingly significant role. We did 
not include data from other rounds because we focus here on the time points closest to the 
peak of the economic crisis.
The dependent variable ‘attitudes toward immigrants’ was constructed as an index 
derived from three items measuring perceived threat due to immigrants. While the measures 
focus on perceived threat, they actually capture the broader concept of ‘attitudes toward the 
immigrant population’ or ‘anti-immigrant sentiments’. Taking the impact of immigrants on the
country into consideration, respondents assessed each item on an 11-point scale ranging from 
0 (good) to 10 (bad). The first item pertains to the impact that immigrants exert on the 
economy, the second item focuses on immigrants’ impact on the culture, and the third item 
deals with the general impact that immigrants have on the country (for an exact wording of 
the items and all other individual-level variables, see Appendix A). The resulting composite 
score ranged from 0 (a very positive impact) to 10 (a very negative impact). Previous studies 
(e.g. Davidov et al., 2015, 2016a; Meuleman and Billiet, 2012) demonstrated, by using 
multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA: Bollen, 1989; Brown, 2015), that these
measurements are both reliable and comparable across the countries included in the ESS. 
Comparability across countries and time points is a preliminary condition to conduct a 
meaningful comparative analysis on attitudes (Davidov et al., 2014b). In addition, we 
conducted MGCFA for these indicators for each country across the two time points. The 
factor loadings of all items were 0.7 or higher, indicating high measurement reliability 
(Brown, 2015). Furthermore, we managed to establish scalar invariance (Davidov et al., 
2014b) over time between 2006 and 2010 in all countries for these measurements (with partial
scalar invariance for Spain and Ireland). Thus, these findings allow us to use the index with 
these indicators in the analysis and interpret the results meaningfully.
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Individual-level predictors of attitudes toward immigrants include: Perceived income 
insecurity (also referred to as subjective income) measured as a response to the question 
assessing the feeling about the household income on a 4-point scale (1 = Living comfortably 
on present income, 2 = Coping on present income, 3 = Difficult on present income, 4 = Very 
difficult on present income). Time was measured with the year in which the survey took place 
(1 = 2010, 0 = 2006 or 2004 for Greece). In addition, we included several control variables. 
We coded employment status as 1 if unemployed (and zero otherwise). We coded the 
education level as an ordinal variable according to the International Standard Classification of
Education (ISCED) scheme ranging from 0 (Less than lower secondary education; ISCED 0-
1) to 5 (Tertiary education completed; ISCED 5-6). In addition, we controlled for age (in 
years), gender (1 = female, 0 = male), self-assessed religiosity (measured on an 11-point scale
ranging from 0 = not all religious to 10 = very religious), type of place of residence (1 = big 
city or suburbs or outskirts of big city, 0 = otherwise), and self-reported political orientation 
(ranging from 0 = left to 10 = right). Previous research demonstrated that older, less educated,
unemployed, right-wing males, and those living in rural areas report more negative attitudes 
toward immigrants. (Semyonov et al., 2006). Following research which has shown that value 
orientations are important predictors of attitudes toward immigrants (e.g. Davidov et al., 
2008a, Davidov et al., 2008b; Davidov and Meuleman, 2012; Davidov et al., 2014a, 2016b), 
we also included conservation4 and self-transcendence values among the independent 
variables. Conservation was a summary index combining six items measuring the importance 
of three sub-dimensions: tradition, conformity, and security. Universalism was a summative 
index combining five items measuring the importance of two sub-dimensions: universalism 
and benevolence. The questions measure the similarity of a respondent to the motivations, 
goals, and aspirations of a described person (gender-matched), and they were measured on a 
scale ranging from 1 = very much like me to 6 = not like me at all, reverse coded (for a 
detailed definition of the variables and their measurements, see Appendix A and Davidov et 
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al., 2008b). Past studies suggest that at least metric invariance is given for these values across 
most ESS countries (Cieciuch et al., 2016; Davidov et al., 2008b; Zercher et al., 2015). 
Davidov and colleagues (2008a) and Davidov and Meuleman (2012) showed that people 
scoring high on conservation values are more negative and self-transcendent people more 
positive toward immigrants. The full list of individual-level variables with question wording 
and response categories is displayed in Appendix A.
Two country-level contextual variables capturing economic conditions assessed 
whether changes of objective and subjective (perceived) economic conditions influenced anti-
immigrant attitudes. The objective economic conditions were operationalized by 
unemployment rate in a country (ILO, 2013). Unemployment rate in 2006 (before the peak of 
the crisis) and in 2010 (after the peak of the crisis) was an average over two years: 2006 or 
2010 and the previous year, respectively. To operationalize subjective economic insecurity at 
the country level, we calculated the mean response to the question measuring perceived 
income in each country. This question assessed the feeling about household’s income on a 4-
point scale. We aggregated responses to this question in each country in 2006 and in 2010. We
calculated measures of change for unemployment rates, perceived income insecurity, and 
aggregated anti-immigrant sentiments by subtracting the value in 2006 from the value in 2010
and then dividing it by the initial value in 2006. In the multivariate analyses, we controlled for
the share of non-EU immigrants relative to the population size and the level of GDP per capita
(divided by 1,000). We obtained information on the GDP from the World Bank´s database, 
World DataBank (World Bank, 2015). Appendix A lists also all the country/time-level 
variables in the analysis. Appendix B lists the share of non-EU immigrants and GDP/c by 
country and year.
Analysis and Results
Descriptive overview
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In Table 2 we describe mean values of anti-immigrant sentiments, unemployment rate, and 
perceived income insecurity in 2006 (prior to the economic crisis) and in 2010 (after the peak 
of the crisis) by country. The data reveal variation across countries and over time in the 
variables listed in the table. 
Table 2 about here
The most extreme level of anti-immigrant sentiment before the economic crisis was in 
Greece followed by Great Britain, France, Portugal, and Germany. The most positive attitudes
toward immigrants before the crisis were in Sweden followed by Finland. All other countries 
were in between. Change rates in attitudes toward immigrants between the two time 
measurements were rather moderate in most countries (see also Hatton, 2014a, 2014b). The 
most dramatic rise in anti-immigrant attitude took place in Ireland (26% increase). We can 
observe a substantial rise in negative attitudes also in Greece (where attitudes were initially 
most negative) as well as in Finland and Belgium. In contrast, attitudes toward immigrants 
became more positive in Sweden (where attitudes were initially very positive) and in 
Germany. 
As depicted in Table 2, the unemployment rate before the crisis was highest in 
Germany followed by Spain, France, and Greece. In contrast, the unemployment rate before 
the crisis was lowest in Norway, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Ireland. 
Unemployment increased in most (but not all) countries. The rise in unemployment was 
especially pronounced in Spain (where the unemployment rate more than doubled), Greece, 
Ireland (where it was initially low but more than doubled during the economic crisis), 
Portugal, and Denmark. The unemployment rate decreased slightly, however, in Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway.
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Countries not only varied in unemployment rate (as an objective proxy of economic 
conditions) but also in the level of perceived income of the country’s respondents (as an 
indicator of subjective economic conditions). The mean level of perceived income insecurity 
before the crisis was highest in Greece and Portugal and lowest in Sweden and Denmark. 
Compared to the changes in unemployment rate, changes in the mean levels of perceived 
income insecurity were less dramatic in most countries. Nonetheless, a considerable increase 
took place in Ireland and Greece, whereas perceived income insecurity slightly decreased in 
Germany, Switzerland, and Norway
The descriptive findings so far inform us about stability and change in level of anti-
immigrant attitudes and in the objective and subjective economic conditions in the 14 
European countries before and after the peak of the economic crisis. In the following we first 
examine the country-level associations between anti-immigrant attitudes and the objective as 
well as subjective economic conditions in 2006 and in 2010 separately. We display these 
associations in Figures 1 and 2. Then we turn to an analysis of the associations between 
country-level changes in anti-immigrant attitudes and country-level changes in the objective 
as well as subjective economic conditions.5 We would like to note, however, that these 
associations do not test our hypotheses, since we can neither rule out individual level 
characteristics nor compositional effects. Nevertheless, they provide valuable information 
about the countries. We present them in Table 2 and Figure 3.
Figures 1 and 2 about here
As Figure 1 demonstrates, the country-level associations between anti-immigrant 
attitudes and unemployment rates are positive both in 2006 (r = .453) and 2010 (r = .338), 
indicating that higher unemployment rates are associated with higher levels of anti-immigrant 
sentiments in both years.6 Likewise, Figure 2 reveals that country-level anti-immigrant 
attitudes and mean levels of perceived income insecurity are highly and significantly 
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correlated in both 2006 (r = .745) and 2010 (r = .840), indicating that countries with higher 
perceived income insecurity tend to show higher levels of anti-immigrant attitudes both 
before and after the crisis. The findings also show that at each point in time, anti-immigrant 
attitudes were more strongly related to subjective economic conditions than to objective 
economic conditions. Indeed, the results of the analysis suggest that, on average, country 
average anti-immigrant sentiments tend to be less pronounced in prosperous countries and 
more pronounced in countries where economic conditions, whether objective or subjective, 
are more suppressed. Sensitivity analyses without Ireland, a country that suffered from the 
most severe increase in unemployment, portray a similar picture.
Table 3 and Figure 3 about here
The associations between change in anti-immigrant attitudes and change in 
unemployment rates demonstrate that countries with an increase in unemployment rates are 
likely to experience an increase in anti-immigrant sentiments. This is evident in the positive 
correlation between change in unemployment rate and change in attitudes (r = .737, Table 2). 
It is interesting to note that the association between change in anti-immigrant sentiments and 
the aggregated change in subjective income insecurity is even stronger than the association 
between changes in unemployment and attitudes, as evidenced by the very high correlation (r 
= .912) between the former (see also Table 2). In other words, the data lend support to the 
expectation that countries which experienced an increase in the indicator of perceived (i.e. 
subjective) income insecurity also experienced an increase in anti-immigrant sentiments. A 
sensitivity analysis (see Wilkes et al., 2007) without Ireland produced a similar picture – 
albeit not as strong in the case of the association between change in anti-immigrant attitudes 
and change in unemployment rates (r = .245). 
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Predicting anti-immigrant attitudes by change in economic conditions
The results of the country-level descriptive analyses suggest that levels of both objective and 
subjective economic conditions in a country are associated with country-level attitudes toward
immigrants. They also suggest that country-level change in economic conditions may be 
associated with country-level change in anti-immigrant sentiments. However, the country-
level analysis does not control for the characteristics of the individuals and for possible 
compositional effects. Ideally, one needs panel data to evaluate whether change in individual-
level attitudes is associated with change in (whether objective or subjective) economic 
conditions while controlling for socio-demographic characteristics. Unfortunately, the ESS 
does not provide panel data but only cross-sectional information. Therefore, we utilize 
country change scores in objective and subjective economic conditions between 2006 and 
2010 (before and after the peak of the crisis) for groups of countries as independent variables 
to study country-level change in attitudes between 2006 and 2010 while controlling for 
individual-level attributes. This model allows us to examine Hypotheses 2a,b and 3a,b, 
namely, whether and to what extent hostility toward immigrants is higher in countries with 
worsening (objective or subjective) economic conditions (and lower in countries with 
improving economic conditions) controlling for characteristics of the countries and the 
individuals residing in the country. 7
In the analysis that follows, we pooled the data across countries and conducted 
multivariate analyses to estimate the effect of change in (objective and subjective) economic 
conditions on attitudes toward immigrants while controlling for various country- and 
individual-level predictors8. We distinguished among three groups of countries according to 
stability and change in objective and subjective economic conditions: countries where 
unemployment declined between 2006 and 2010, countries with stable unemployment rates, 
and countries where unemployment rates rose during this period. The reference group was the
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group of countries with stable unemployment. Furthermore, we distinguished between 
countries where perceived income insecurity declined between 2006 and 2010, countries with 
stable perceived income insecurity, and countries where perceived income insecurity rose 
during this period. The reference group was the group of countries with stable perceived 
income insecurity. 9 
Subsequently, we estimated a series of OLS regression equations with robust standard 
errors (using the software package Mplus [Muthén and Muthén, 1998-2012]) that included 
individual-level predictors of attitudes plus the dummy variables representing the groups of 
countries. Three equations were estimated: In equation 1, the attitudes toward immigrants 
were predicted as a function of individual-level attributes plus year (in order to estimate 
average net change in attitudes over time). In equations 2 and 3, we included the dummy 
variables that represented countries with increase or decrease in unemployment (equation 2) 
and perceived income insecurity (equation 3) with stable countries as the reference category. 
Then we included in equations 2 and 3 the interaction terms between the country dummies 
and year, as predictors of attitudes to test Hypotheses 2 and 3. We controlled for the share of 
the non-European population in the country and for the country-level GDP per capita in all the
models. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4 about here
Equation 1 in Table 4 reveals that, on average, negative attitudes toward immigrants 
increased between 2006 and 2010 as evident by the positive effect of year (b = .079). In line 
with previous research, anti-immigrant attitudes tend to decrease with education and to 
increase with income insecurity as well as with unemployment. These findings provide firm 
support for the hypothesis (H1) that socially and economically vulnerable individuals tend to 
be more hostile toward immigrants (regardless of the year surveyed). Individuals with right-
wing political orientation tend to have higher levels of anti-immigrant attitudes. Females 
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display more negative attitudes, whereas older as well as religious individuals, and those 
living in a city, express less negative attitudes. Moreover, attributing importance to 
conservation values is associated with higher levels of anti-immigrant attitudes whereas 
attributing priority to self-transcendence values predicts lower levels of anti-immigrant 
sentiments. All the effects were quite robust and similar to those found in the country-specific 
analyses that we performed.10 Furthermore, consistent with previous studies, a higher share of 
non-EU immigrants relative to the population size is associated with more hostile attitudes, 
whereas higher levels of GDP per capita are associated with less hostile attitudes.
In equation 2 we introduced two dummy variables distinguishing between countries 
that experienced an increase in unemployment and countries that experienced a decline in the 
unemployment rate between 2006 and 2010 as compared to those with stable economic 
conditions as well as the interaction terms between the country dummy variables and year. 
Table 4 demonstrates, in support of hypothesis H2a, that higher anti-immigrant attitudes were 
more pronounced in countries with rising unemployment rates from 2006 to 2010 compared 
to those with stable economic conditions as evident in the (weak but) positive interaction 
effect between the year dummy and the dummy variable representing the group of countries 
with rising unemployment (see also Figure 4a). Furthermore, and in line with hypothesis H2b,
in countries with declining unemployment rates, anti-immigrant attitudes in 2010 were lower 
compared to countries with stable economic conditions as indicated by the negative 
interaction coefficient of these country dummy variables and time. 
In equation 3, the unemployment criterion for distinguishing between groups of 
countries was replaced by the subjective criterion based on the aggregated population 
response regarding how well respondents felt about their own income. In line with hypothesis 
H3a, and as indicated by the significant positive interaction coefficient, anti-immigrant 
attitudes were more pronounced in countries where subjective income insecurity increased 
21
compared to countries with stable subjective economic conditions (see also Figure 4b). 
Additionally, and in support of Hypothesis H3b, as indicated by the negative interaction 
coefficient, anti-immigrant attitudes in 2010 was less pronounced in the countries with a 
decrease in subjective income insecurity compared to countries with stable conditions. This is 
also displayed in Figure 4b. Thus, anti-immigrant attitudes were lower in 2010 in countries 
with a decrease in subjective income insecurity and higher in countries with an increase in 
subjective income insecurity compared to countries in which subjective economic conditions 
remained stable. 
Figure 4 about here
As Ireland displayed the most extreme increase in unemployment, we re-analyzed the 
models without Ireland. These models supported empirically only Hypotheses 3a and 3b (with
the effect of improvement or decline in subjective economic insecurity) but not Hypotheses 
2a and 2b (with the effect of increase or decline in unemployment).11On the basis of this 
analysis we can conclude that, when controlling for the individual-level attributes, anti-
immigrant sentiments were significantly more pronounced in countries with deteriorating 
subjective economic conditions and less pronounced in countries with an improvement in 
subjective economic conditions (as compared to the countries with stable subjective economic
conditions). Findings for the effect of changes in unemployment on changes in anti-immigrant
attitudes were not as clear. Thus, the results displayed in Table 4 and Figure 4 provide support 
for the theoretical expectations that change in subjective economic conditions can be 
consequential for the formation of attitudes toward immigrants in times of economic crisis as 
the one experienced in 2008 in Europe. 
Summary and discussion
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In the present paper we use the 2008 economic crisis in Europe to formulate a natural 
experimental research design that enables a direct examination of theoretical expectations 
regarding the impact of deteriorating economic conditions on attitudes toward immigrants. 
More specifically, we utilized data from two rounds of the ESS data set before and after the 
peak of the European economic crisis in 14 European Western immigration countries to 
examine the expectations that anti-immigrant sentiment would be higher among economically
vulnerable individuals and in countries that experienced more severe objective and subjective 
economic decline. In line with previous research, the data analysis provided firm support for 
the expectation that individuals who feel less secure with their income are more likely to have
negative attitudes toward immigrants. Yet the data provided only partial support for our 
expectation regarding the association between change in objective and subjective economic 
conditions and anti-immigrant attitudes. More specifically, we found a robust association 
between anti-immigrant sentiments with change in subjective economic conditions, but not 
with change in unemployment rates. 12
Remarkably, change in country-level subjective perceptions of the economic situation 
were much more relevant than objective economic indicators (e.g. change in unemployment 
rates) for predicting anti-immigrant sentiments. Apparently, perceptions of threat as reflected 
by subjective evaluations of the economic situation play a stronger role in formation of anti-
immigrant attitudes than realistic threat as reflected by objective economic conditions. Indeed,
a shift in public views regarding the economic situation is likely to result in higher levels of 
anti-immigrant sentiment. The more economically insecure the public feels, the more extreme 
is the rise in hostility and in negative attitudes toward immigrants. 
Ideally, our analysis would employ panel data to evaluate the association between 
changes in economic conditions and changes in negative attitudes toward immigrants (while 
controlling for the effect of individual-level and socio-demographic characteristics). The ESS 
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data set, however, provides us with only repeated cross-sectional data with information 
obtained from different respondents at each time point (but not with individual-level panel 
data). Subsequently, we adopted an analytical strategy that enabled the examination of the 
effect of change in objective or subjective economic conditions on change in respondents' 
country-level attitudes toward immigrants before and after the crisis (while controlling for the 
socio-economic and demographic attributes of the respondents). We do hope that future 
studies employing panel data could deliver further evidence as to the ways through which 
changes in objective or subjective economic conditions are related to changes in anti-
immigrant attitudes. The dynamic analytical approach that was adopted in the present research
leads us to the conclusion that changes in subjective economic conditions in times of the 
European economic crisis were significantly related to changes in attitudes toward 
immigrants. That is, anti-immigrant sentiment intensified in countries where people perceived
that the economic conditions in the country were deteriorating. 
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Tables
Table 1: Summary of predictors and hypotheses
Hypotheses Explanatory variables Equations 
Individual-level
(H1) we expect that the lower the 
subjective (perceived) income the 
stronger the negative attitudes toward 
immigrants at both points in time
Perceived income insecurity 1
Control variables
Year all
Age all
Female all
Living in a city all
Religiosity all
Political orientation all
Conservation all
Self-transcendence all
Education all
Unemployment all
Country-level
(H2a) We expect rising unemployment in 
a country to result in more negative 
attitudes toward immigrants
Group of countries with rising 
unemployment*time
2
(H2b) We expect declining 
unemployment rates to result in less 
negative attitudes toward immigrants 
Group of countries with 
declining unemployment*time
2
(H3a)We expect rising aggregate levels 
of subjective income insecurity to result 
in more negative attitudes toward 
immigrants
Group of countries with rising 
subjective income 
insecurity*time
3
(H3b) We expect declining aggregate 
levels of subjective income insecurity to 
result in less negative attitudes toward 
immigrants
Group of countries with 
declining subjective income 
insecurity*time
3
Control variables
Share of non-EU immigrants all
GDP/c *100 all
Rising unemployment 2
Declining unemployment 2
Rising perceived income 
insecurity
3
Declining perceived income 
insecurity
3
33
Table 2. Descriptive overview: Mean anti-immigrant attitudes, unemployment rate, and mean perceived income insecurity in 14 European countries in 2006 and 2010 with 
country sample sizes in the last column
Anti-immigrant 
attitudes
Unemployment rate Mean of perceived income
insecurity
n
2006 2010 change 2006 2010 change 2006 2010 change 2006 2010
BE 5.04 5.21 3% 8.40 8.10 -4% 1.83 1.79 -2% 1,479 1,352
CH 4.41 4.29 -3% 4.25 4.35 2% 1.59 1.51 -5% 1,210 947
DE 5.16 4.87 -6% 10.75 7.45 -31% 1.97 1.84 -7% 2,483 2,452
DK 4.29 4.35 1% 4.35 6.75 55% 1.37 1.36 -1% 1,316 1,361
ES 4.70 4.81 2% 8.85 18.90 114% 1.85 1.94 5% 1,690 1,658
FI 4.00 4.22 5% 8.05 8.30 3% 1.91 1.95 2% 1,812 1,768
FR 5.42 5.35 -1% 8.85 9.20 4% 1.85 1.86 0% 1,563 1,362
GB 5.68 5.65 -1% 5.10 7.70 51% 1.78 1.88 6% 1,979 1,940
GR 6.51 7.13 10% 9.85 11.15 13% 2.52 2.84 12% 1,985 2,293
IE 4.29 5.39 26% 4.40 12.95 194% 1.66 2.22 34% 1,481 2,065
NL 4.64 4.52 -3% 4.30 3.95 -8% 1.65 1.63 -1% 1,590 1,561
NO 4.58 4.50 -2% 3.90 3.30 -15% 1.53 1.45 -5% 1,539 1,307
PT 5.41 5.48 1% 7.75 10.30 33% 2.50 2.51 0% 2,011 1,949
SE 3.98 3.55 -11% 7.45 8.50 14% 1.48 1.44 -3% 1,531 1,197
Total 4.87 4.95 2% 6.88 8.64 30% 1.82 1.87 3% 23,669 23,212
Note: n: number of individual cases; Greece: 2004 instead of 2006; the data do not contain respondents who were not born in the country or whose mother or father were not born
in the country.
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Table 3. Country-level correlations between change rates of anti-immigrant attitudes, unemployment, and 
perceived income insecurity (14 countries)
∆ Anti-
immigrant 
attitudes
∆ Unemployment 
rate
∆ Perceived 
income 
insecurity
∆ Anti-immigrant 
attitudes
1 .579* .891***
∆ Unemployment 
rate
.737** 1 .660*
∆ Perceived income 
insecurity
.912*** .843*** 1
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, residual correlations above the diagonal, correlations between change 
variables below diagonal. Residuals were obtained by regressing anti-immigrant attitudes, unemployment rates, 
and perceived income insecurity, respectively, in 2010 on anti-immigrant attitudes, unemployment rates, and 
perceived income insecurity in 2006.
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Table 4. Pooled OLS regression equations predicting the level of anti-immigrant sentiments in 2006 and 2010 by
individual-level attributes, year of survey, and three types of countries (classified according to the change in 
objective and subjective economic conditions)
H Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq.3
Intercept .4817*** 4.820*** 4.606***
Age -.001* -.001** -.001
Female .161*** .162*** .158***
City -.100*** -.096*** -.115***
Religiosity -.033*** -.029*** -.032***
Political orientation .097*** .101*** .101***
Conservation .574*** .567*** .530***
Self-transcendence -.568*** -.557*** -.539***
Education - -.260*** -.267*** -.263***
Unemployment + .220*** .225*** .189***
Perceived income insecurity + .423*** .404*** .382***
Year (2010) .060*** .038 -.008
Groups of countries classified by changing obj.
and sub. economic conditions             
(stable countries are the reference category) : 
Rising unemployment -.132***
Declining unemployment .424***
Rising unemployment*time + .078*
Declining unemployment*time _ -.119*
Rising perceived income insecurity .317***
Declining perceived income insecurity .558***
Rising perceived income insecurity*time + .355***
Declining perceived income insecurity*time - -.076+
Stock of immigrants .086*** .083*** .002
GDP/c*1000 -.020*** -.029*** -.029***
Adjusted R2 .193 .196 .192
Note: Rising unemployment rates = Countries in which unemployment rates increased by at least 10% (DK, ES, 
GB, GR, IE, PT, SE); Declining unemployment rates = Countries in which unemployment rates decreased by at 
least 10% (DE, NO); Rising perceived income insecurity = Countries in which mean levels of perceived income 
insecurity increased by at least 3% (ES, GB, GR, IE,); Declining perceived income insecurity = Countries in 
which mean levels of perceived income insecurity increased by at least 3% (CH, DE, NO). All other countries 
constitute the reference category. 
+p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; equal weighted country cases n = 46,881 individuals in 14 countries
and two time points, 2006 and 2010; Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation; age, education, 
religiosity, political orientation, conservation, self-transcendence, and perceived income insecurity were centered
around the grand mean.
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Figure 1. Associations between anti-immigrant attitudes and unemployment rates in 2006 (Figure 1a) and 2010 
(Figure 1b) in 14 European countries. Note: A sensitivity analysis excluding Ireland provides similar findings.
(a)
(b)
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Figure 2. Associations between anti-immigrant attitudes and country mean levels of perceived income insecurity
in 2006 (Figure 2a) and 2010 (Figure 2b) in 14 European countries. Note: A sensitivity analysis excluding 
Ireland provides similar findings.
(a)
(b)
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Figure 3. Associations between change in anti-immigrant sentiments, change in unemployment rates (Figure 
3a), and change in perceived income insecurity (Figure 3b). Note: A sensitivity analysis excluding Ireland 
provides similar findings.
(a)
(b)
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Figure 4. Change in anti-immigrants attitudes over time in three groups of countries: countries with worsening 
objective (a) or subjective (b) economic conditions; countries with improving objective (a) or subjective (b) 
economic conditions; countries with stable economic conditions.
(a)
(b)
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APPENDIX A. Question wording and operationalization of variables in the analyses
Variables Question wording and operationalization
Individual-level variables1
Attitudes toward immigration Summative index combining three items measuring respondents’ assessment of immigrants’ impact on the country:
(1) “Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other 
countries?” (0 = “bad for the economy” to 10 = “good for the economy”, reverse coded); 
(2) “And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people 
coming to live here from other countries?” (0 = “cultural life undermined” to 10 = “cultural life enriched”, reverse 
coded); 
(3) “Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?” (0 = 
“worse place to live” to 10 = “better place to live”, reverse coded)
Age In years
Gender Female = 1
Type of place of residence “Which phrase on this card best describes the area where you live?”: 1 = big city or suburbs or outskirts of big city, 0 
= otherwise
Education level  “What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed?”: 1 = Less than lower secondary education 
(ISCED 0-1), 2 = Lower secondary education completed (ISCED 2), 3 = Upper secondary education completed 
(ISCED 3), 4 = Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed (ISCED 4), 5 = Tertiary education completed 
(ISCED 5-6), post coded 
Religiosity “How religious are you?” Measured on a scale: 0 = not at all religious to 10 = very religious
Political orientation “In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, 
where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?” Measured on a scale: 0 = left to 10 = right
Conservation ESS value scale (Schwartz, 2003)
Summative index combining six items measuring the importance of three sub-dimensions of conservation: tradition, 
conformity, and security. The questions measure the similarity of a respondent to the motivations, goals, and 
aspirations of a described person (gender-matched), measured on a scale: 1 = very much like me to 6 = not like me at 
all, reverse coded: 
“Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is 
not like you. Use this card for your answer.”
(1) “It is important to her/him to be humble and modest. She/he tries not to draw attention to herself/himself.”
(2) “Tradition is important to her/him. She/he tries to follow the customs handed down by her/his religion or her/his 
family.”
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(3) “It is important to her/him always to behave properly. She/he wants to avoid doing anything people would say is 
wrong.”
(4) “She/he believes that people should do what they're told. She/he thinks people should follow rules at all times, 
even when no one is watching.”
(5) “It is important to her/him to live in secure surroundings. She/he avoids anything that might endanger her/his 
safety.”
(6) “It is important to her/him that the government ensures her/his safety against all threats. She/he wants the state to 
be strong so it can defend its citizens.”
Self-transcendence Summative index combining five items measuring the importance of two sub-dimensions of self-transcendence: 
universalism and benevolence. The questions measure the similarity of a respondent to the motivations, goals, and 
aspirations of a described person (gender-matched), measured on a scale: 1 = very much like me to 6 = not like me at 
all, reverse coded: 
“Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is 
not like you. Use this card for your answer.”
(1) “It's very important to her/him to help the people around her/him. She/he wants to care for their well-being.”
(2) “It is important to her/him to be loyal to her/his friends. She/he wants to devote herself/himself to people close to 
her/him.”
(3) “She/he thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. She/he believes everyone 
should have equal opportunities in life.”
(4) “It is important to her/him to listen to people who are different from her/him. Even when she/he disagrees with 
them, she/he still wants to understand them.”
(5) “She/he strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to 
her/him.”
Unemployment “And which of these descriptions best describes your situation (in the last seven days)?” , Unemployed, looking/not 
looking for a job = 1, post coded
Perceived income insecurity “Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?”: 1 
= Living comfortably on present income, 2 = Coping on present income, 3 = Difficult on present income, 4 = Very 
difficult on present income
Time Year in which survey was conducted: 1 = 2010, 0 = 2006
Country-level variables
Objective economic conditionsb Unemployment rates (International Labor Force Survey: International Labour Organization, ILO, 2013)
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Mean of 2005 and 2006 for 2006a
Mean of 2009 and 2010 for 2010
Subjective economic situationb Mean response to the question regarding perceived income insecurity in each country (see individual-level variable 
Perceived income insecurity)
Share of non-EU nationals as a 
percentage of the total population
Source: EUROSTAT, own calculations based on information about population size and number of 
EU-25 nationals for 2006a, 
EU-27 nationals for 2010
GDP / capita GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) divided by 1,000. Data are in constant 2011 international 
dollars.
Mean of 2005 and 2006 for 2006d
Mean of 2009 and 2010 for 2010
Note: 
1Source: European Social Survey round 3 (2006) and round 5 (2010), Greece did not participate in 2006. Therefore, we make use of the second wave of the ESS in 2004 for this 
country;
Data can be downloaded from http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/downloadwizard/. Further information on documentation and methodology is available at 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/ and http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/methodology/. 
a 2004 for Greece: Mean of 2001 and 2007
b For the computation of change scores, see Footnote 3. 
c World Bank, International Comparison Program database. Data from database: World Development Indicators, downloaded from 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD&country=
d2004 for Greece: Mean of 2003 and 2004
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APPENDIX B. Share of non-EU immigrants and GDP/c by country and year
Share of non-EU immigrants GDP/c
2006 2010 2006 2010
BE 2.7 % 3.2 % 40,314 40,538
CH 8.7 % 8.2 % 51,608 53,351
DE 6.2 % 5.6 % 38,904 40,089
DK 3.7 % 3.9 % 44,151 42,244
ES 7.2 % 7.2 % 33,731 32,999
FI 1.4 % 1.9 % 39,436 38,968
FR 3.8 % 3.9 % 36,686 36,468
GB 3.6 % 4.0 % 37,165 36,119
GR 6.7 % 7.0 % 29,903 30,288
IE 3.7 % 3.6 % 48,692 44,299
NL 2.8 % 2.6 % 43,958 45,638
NO 2.7 % 3.0 % 63,468 62,114
PT 1.8 % 3.4 % 26,584 26,798
SE 3.0 % 3.6 % 42,188 42,018
Total 4.1 % 4.4 % 41,199 40,852
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APPENDIX C. Results of a multilevel analysis predicting the level of anti-immigrant attitudes in 2010 (N = 
14 countries X 2 time points = 28 country/time units).
Note: +p < .10, * p < .05,
** p < .01, *** p < .001; equal weighted country*time cases n=28, n(individuals)= 45,785; Due to reasons of 
model identification, missing cases for variables with less than 1% missing values were deleted from the 
analyses; FIML estimation.
Age, education, religiosity, conservation, self-transcendence, and perceived income insecurity as well as 
unemployment rates, mean perceived income insecurity, GDP/pc, and stock of immigrants were grand-mean 
centered. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model3 Model 4
Intercept 4.804*** 4.809*** 4.815*** 4.795***
Individual-level variables
Age -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001
Female .156*** .156*** .156*** .156***
City -.166*** -.167*** -.167*** -.167***
Education -.292*** -.292*** -.292*** -.292***
Religiosity -.031*** -.031*** -.031*** -.031***
Political orientation .106*** .106*** .106*** .106***
Conservation .509*** .509*** .509*** .509***
Self-transcendence -.537*** -.537*** -.537*** -.537***
Unemployment .234*** .234*** .234*** .234***
Perceived income 
insecurity
.304*** .303*** .303*** .303***
Country/time-level 
variables
Time .044 .083 .077 .105
Unemployment rate -.036 -.030 -.039
Unemployment rate*time -.007
Mean perceived income 
insecurity
1.061** 1.059** .868*
Mean perceived income 
insecurity*time
.299
GDP/c*1000 -.022* -.002 -.001 -.003
Stock immigrants .064 .060 .060 .061
Variance components
Residual variance 3.080*** 3.080*** 3.080*** 3.080***
Intercept variance .277*** .209*** .209*** .207***
1 Previous studies suggest that the economic crisis has not necessarily resulted on average in more negative attitudes 
toward immigrants across European countries (Davis and Deole 2015; Hatton 2014a, 2014b; Ziller 2014). This could be
attributed to the fact that in some countries attitudes became more positive and in others more negative. It should also 
be noted that the studies of Hatton (2014a, 2014b) included a slightly different set of countries than those in the current 
study. We included in our study only Western European countries.
2 We expect the individual effect of income to operate similarly at the two time points because we have no theoretical 
reasons to expect otherwise.
3 Greece did not participate in 2006. Therefore, we make use of the second wave of the ESS in 2004 for this country. 
Greece is probably one of the European countries that suffered the most during the crisis. Therefore, we believe that it is
essential to include Greece in the analysis.
4 The term ‘conservation’ refers to social conservation of the status quo. It represents a higher-order factor in the value 
theory of Schwartz (1992, 1994; see also Schwartz et al. 2012) and includes the values tradition, conformity and 
security. The editor of IJCS noted that some readers might think this measure gauges what people would call 
'conservative values'; that description seems to conform better with typical English usage. But Schwartz decided to label
it differently and we use his nomenclature.
5 We calculated measures of change (i.e. unemployment rate, income insecurity, anti-immigrant sentiment) by 
subtracting the value in 2006 from the value in 2010 and then dividing it by the initial value in 2006. A second measure 
of change based on analysis of residuals leads to similar findings. 
6 With only 14 cases in the analysis, statistical significance at conventional levels is not as crucial. The association is 
significant in 2006 but insignificant in 2010. 
7 We present, in Appendix C, a multilevel analysis with 28 country*time points as macro units. As contextual 
variables, we introduce the unemployment rates, the aggregate levels of perceived income insecurity, and the 
interactions of both variables with the year 2010. Its findings point to the same direction as our OLS analyses reported 
below. 
8 We assume the effects of all independent variables to be similar at the two times unless we introduced an interaction 
effect with time. As the stability or change of the effects of all other individual-level variables are beyond the scope of 
our study, we make use of a fixed panel regression approach. Using the general and more flexible structural equation 
modeling (SEM) approach would allow testing whether all effects in the model are similar or different both across time 
and countries. (Bollen and Brand, 2010). 
9 We classified countries that experienced increase in unemployment as those countries where unemployment rates 
increased by at least 10% between 2006 and 2010 (DK, ES, GB, GR, IE, PT, SE). We classified countries that 
experienced decrease in unemployment rates as those countries where unemployment rates decreased by at least 10% 
between 2006 and 2010 (DE, NO). The other countries were classified as countries that did not experience any 
considerable change in unemployment relatively to the other countries in the study (BE, CH, FI, FR, NL). We classified 
countries that experienced increase in subjective income insecurity as those countries where the aggregated score of 
subjective income insecurity increased by at least 3% between 2006 and 2010 (ES, GB, GR, IE). We classified countries
that experienced decrease in subjective economic insecurity as those countries where the aggregated score of subjective 
income insecurity decreased by at least 3% between 2006 and 2010 (CH, DE, NO). The other countries were classified 
as such which did not experience any considerable change in subjective economic conditions relative to the other 
countries in the study (BE, DE, FI, FR, NL, PT, SE). These cut-off points were arbitrary but robust to the selection of 
slightly different cut-off points.
10 Results of these additional analyses may be provided by the first author upon request.
11 Finally, we estimated a multilevel analysis on the same data in which we included, as predictors of anti-
immigration attitudes, the country-level scores for unemployment rates and aggregated subjective insecurity as well as 
the interaction of both variables with year instead of the country group dummies. Findings reveal that the effect of 
aggregated subjective income insecurity was stronger after the crisis in 2010 compared to 2006. By way of contrast, the 
effect of unemployment rates did not increase from 2006 to 2010. 
12 Country-level attitudinal change patterns over time were modest as observed also by Hatton (2014a, 2014b), but 
they did take place, and they did differ across countries. These change patterns may be a consequence of factors not 
considered in this study. For example, previous studies demonstrated that policy (Hatton, 2014a; Schlüter et al., 2013) 
or media (Schlüter and Davidov 2013) explain, at least in part, variation in country-level attitudes toward immigration. 
Future studies should explore whether changes in country policies toward immigration or change in the positivity or 
negativity of the media coverage about immigration had any influence on the level and change of attitudes toward 
immigration before and after the economic crisis over and beyond the effect of the changes in objective and subjective 
economic conditions.
